NH Supreme Court Clarifies Law Relating to Highways by Prescription

Public highways established by prescription are only those that have been used for public travel for 20 years prior to January 1, 1968. (See NH RSA 229:1.)  In Town of Dunbarton v. Guiney et al. (decided February 5, 2020), the New Hampshire Supreme Court clarified the nature of the proof needed to establish a highway by prescription. The trial court in that case found that a highway by prescription had been established; however, the Supreme Court reversed, finding that there had been insufficient proof as to the “adversity” of the public’s use of the way. 

The Supreme Court first cited the general law that to establish a highway by prescription it must be shown that the general public used the way continuously for a period of 20 years prior to 1968 and that the public use was adverse (i.e., without the owner’s permission). The primary evidence introduced to show the highway by prescription was maps that pre-dated 1968 by more than 20 years. The Court held that the maps, by themselves, were competent evidence to support an inference of continuous and uninterrupted public use but were not sufficient to support a finding that the public use was adverse to the owner over whose property the way traversed. 

The Court held that to meet the adversity requirement, the nature of the use must be such as to show that the owner knew, or ought to have known, that the right was being exercised, not in reliance upon the owner’s permission, but without regard to the owner’s consent. The only evidence introduced in that regard was that the Town had used the area in question to allow its plow trucks to turn around safely. The Court held that this was insufficient to put the owner on notice that the use was adverse and being made under a claim of right by the Town. The Court appeared to establish the standard as whether or not a reasonable person would understand the municipality to be making a claim of right to the property by its use of the way. 

Lessons learned from this recently decided case include: 

1. Maps predating 1968 are insufficient by themselves to meet the “adversity” requirement for establishing a highway by prescription; 
2. There must be some further indication of adversity, of a claim of right without the owner’s permission, such as stone walls or commercial enterprises along the road; and 
3. To establish the requisite adversity, the general standard is whether a reasonable owner would understand the public to be making a claim of right by its use of the way.

Are Notices of “No Violation” Appealable in Maine?

If a code enforcement officer (CEO) issues a written decision finding “no violation” of a land use ordinance, is that decision appealable? Recently, Maine’s Law Court tackled this very question and answered “yes”—but only so long as the ordinance does not say otherwise.

In Raposa v. Town of York, an abutter became concerned about how a neighbor was using property. The abutter contacted the CEO, who responded to the abutter with an email explaining that no violations were warranted based on the neighbor’s use of the property. The CEO’s email included a notice advising the abutter that the Board of Appeals could hear an appeal from “any order, requirement, decision, or determination” made by the CEO or any other person charged with administering the ordinance. Heeding that advice, the abutter appealed the CEO’s “no violation” determination to the Board of Appeals and then to the Superior Court, where the Town of York moved to dismiss the appeal for lack of jurisdiction. The Superior Court granted the Town’s motion, finding that the Board’s review of the CEO’s decision was advisory and therefore unreviewable.

Reversing the Superior Court, the Law Court explained that Notices of Violation (NOVs) have been generally appealable since 2013—when the Legislature amended the statute governing appeals from municipal boards—except where an ordinance expressly provides that certain decisions are only advisory and may not be appealed. Although the Law Court noted that the plain language of the amended statute does not explicitly address “no violation” notices, the Court also noted that its previous decisions have “expressed the understanding that such ‘no violation’ actions are similarly appealable” because of their potential impact on property uses. In Raposa, the Law Court took the opportunity to make its previous expressions more concrete, holding conclusively that “a CEO’s written decision interpreting a land use ordinance is appealable to the Board and in turn to the Superior Court—whether the CEO finds that there is or is not a violation—so long as the ordinance does not expressly preclude appeal.” Because the Town of York’s ordinance did not have a provision that expressly precluded appeal, the Law Court found that the abutter’s appeal was not subject to dismissal by the Superior Court. 

In light of Raposa, municipalities should review the appeal provisions in their land use ordinances and update them accordingly.